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INTRODUCTION 
A highly regarded television producer creates a series format.1  
He partners with a studio for financing, lines up some big name 
talent, and begins shopping the concept to broadcasters.  His pitch 
is received with enthusiasm and he enters into negotiations with 
one broadcaster.  Executives at other networks, not wanting to miss 
the opportunity for a potential ratings winner, also invite 
negotiations.  Shortly thereafter, the team strikes a production deal 
with one of the networks.  A losing bidder, having failed to secure 
the project, calls an alternate producer who has presented an idea 
in the same genre and suggests that they work together to ‘develop 
something’ in that area.  The losing bidder cranks up the 
production process and launches its version of the program first.  
What result? 
In March 2005, NBC began airing “The Contender,” a reality 
show conceived by Mark Burnett, of “Survivor” fame.  When NBC 
won the contract for the show, Fox, who had been another 
interested network, developed a concept with another producer, 
 
 1 A format is presented in an elaborate package of materials including storylines, 
character descriptions, talent selections, settings, music, game rules, graphics, script 
treatments, production guidelines, etc.  The ordering and selection of these components 
becomes the blueprint for production.  However, the value of a format is not the 
particular elements chosen but a concept that underlies the series and is carried forward in 
each episode. It is somewhere between an abstract idea and the finished program.  It is 
this idea that by necessity must be disclosed to be sold. 
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Endemol, for a very similar program entitled, “The Next Great 
Champ,” and announced an early launch.  Although NBC, 
DreamWorks (Burnett’s studio partner) and Burnett were outraged 
by Fox’s behavior,2 the only legal action initiated by DreamWorks 
and Burnett (NBC did not join as a plaintiff) was a claim for an 
injunction based on violations of California Athletic Commission 
regulations.3  The court denied the motion for a restraining order 
and the action was dismissed.4  NBC decided to push back its 
launch date to mitigate the potential dilution of audience share that 
would certainly result from the simultaneous launch of two 
identically formatted shows. 
As often happens in television format disputes, another 
producer, Leigh Ann Burton, also claimed authorship of the 
concept behind Endemol’s “The Next Great Champ.”5  She had 
previously pitched a boxing reality show concept to Oscar de la 
Hoya’s Golden Boy Productions, the company that collaborated 
with Endemol to deliver the Fox series.6  In defending itself in the 
press, Fox stated that they had received five proposals from 
producers for similar ideas, including Endemol and Burnett.7 
The pattern is a familiar one.  It is seen everyday in the 
television industry.  A writer or producer generates a concept for a 
series and pitches the show format to broadcasters and distributors.  
Shortly thereafter, a similar idea is embodied in a new series 
without the acquirer having hired him to produce the series, or 
compensated him for the idea.  The fundamental difference 
between an expectation that the recipient will pay for the concept if 
 
 2 Scott Collins, Boxing Shows’ Breaks; ‘Champ’ and ‘Contender’ are Fighting Each 
Other in Court, but They’re Both Getting Tax Deals and Disclosure Waivers From the 
State, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, at E1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Lisa de Morales, Fox’s ‘Great Champ’ Still Standing, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2004, at 
C01. 
 5 Wade Paulsen, Fox’s ‘The Next Great Champ’ Faces New Lawsuit Alleging Idea 
Theft, REALTY TV WORLD, Sept. 2, 2004, http://www.realitytvworld.com/news/fox-the-
next-great-champ-faces-new-lawsuit-alleging-idea-theft-2868.php. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Wade Paulsen, Fox’s ‘The Next Great Champ’ Wins First Amendment Court Fight 
Against NBC’s ‘The Contender’, REALTY TV WORLD, Sept. 1, 2004, 
http://www.realitytvworld.com/news/fox-the-next-great-champ-wins-first-amendment-
court-fight-against-nbc-the-contender-2864.php. 
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it is used, and the expectation that the recipient will refrain from 
using an idea unless an agreement is reached is a fundamental 
distinction in television format submission cases.  The law may 
protect the expectation to be paid, but not the expectation of 
exclusive control over the idea. 
The purpose of this paper is not to crusade for the moral rights 
of television format purveyors over the opportunistic behavior of 
broadcasters.  Most participants are repeat players and, from time 
to time, find themselves on either side of such disputes.  The 
production company that pitches a show idea has also been the 
recipient of hundred of pitches from others.8  Furthermore, every 
successful show will attract claims from those who have submitted 
similar ideas to the producing entity or broadcaster in the past.9  
The point, rather, is that a lack of legal consequences for the 
purposeful taking of another’s work will naturally lead to a greater 
tendency to engage in such behavior.  International licensing of 
television formats is worth hundreds of millions of dollars.10  In 
reality most acquirers of programming would prefer to license a 
successful format rather than risk harming long-term relationships 
or incurring great expense in litigation by stealing the idea.  
However, producers and broadcasters lately seem more willing to 
borrow significantly and directly from competitors as well as those 
who pitch television formats in a “desperate search for proven . . . 
adaptable programming to compete in the multichannel age.”11  Is 
the industry as a whole moving toward anarchy, knowing that 
 
 8 Interview conducted March 6, 2005 with Nicole Serratore, former Director of 
Acquisitions, Miramax Films in New York.  As one example, Miramax had at least 
twenty people in the development and acquisitions departments, each of whom might 
receive five to ten pitches or scripts per week, totaling between 5,000 and 10,000 ideas 
received by the company per year. 
 9 See, e.g., Murray v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 844 F.2d 988, 991 (2d Cir. 1988); 
Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C706083, 1990 WL 357611, at *6 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 1990). 
 10 Gautam Malkani, Haven’t We Seen That Programme Somewhere Before? Got Any 
Good Ideas? If So, Beware the Copycats, as Protection of TV Formats is Weak and 
You’ll Need a Detailed ‘Bible’ to Stop the Rip-offs, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Sept. 21, 
2004, Creative Business at 8 [hereinafter Good Ideas]. 
 11 Id. 
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anything short of copyright infringement or a clear contractual 
breach may not be enforceable?12 
At the heart of the problem is a lack of legal certainty in 
disputes regarding idea submissions.  This paper discusses the 
developments arising from the express language of the 1976 
Copyright Act regarding copyright preemption and how these 
developments have affected television format submission cases.  A 
growing number of courts are finding preemption of state law 
claims in idea submission cases.13  The author’s concern is that as 
courts cannot recognize format submission claims, the gentlemen’s 
agreement on which the industry operates, tenuous as it is, is likely 
to break down.  The broadcaster who seeks out and copies the best 
of what creative producers develop will have a competitive 
advantage by not having to invest in developing or acquiring 
formats or remunerating those who do.  If the industry and the 
courts tolerate this practice, competitors must follow the same 
strategy or find themselves at a competitive disadvantage.  
Eventually there is little incentive to invest in creative ideas and all 
programming becomes comodified, reducing the value of the entire 
resource pool and reducing any incentive for innovation.  The 
television industry relies heavily on the process of receiving and 
exploiting pitched formats.14  The idea purveyor derives her 
incentive for innovation from a belief that should the project go 
forward, she will be included in the production and accordingly 
share in the revenues.  Historically, especially among repeat 
players, the industry has recognized this understanding.15 
The Copyright Act of 1976 made fundamental changes that 
affected this balance when it granted federal copyright protection 
to unpublished works.16 At the same time, it preempted state 
 
 12 Examples of recent programs where litigation over format copying  has arisen: The 
Contender versus The Next Great Champ; American Idol, Pop Idol versus X-factor; 
Survivor versus I’m a Celebrity; Survivor versus Boot Camp; Do Over versus That was 
Then; Wife Swap versus Trading Spouses; Forgive Me versus Forgive and Forget. 
 13 See discussion infra Part II. 
 14 See Good Ideas, supra note 10. 
 15 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 16.05[B], at 16-
33 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005) (1978) (discussing industry custom). 
 16 The Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2544 (1978) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102 
(2000)). 
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common law copyright protection for unpublished works, because 
now such works fall within the scope of federal copyright.17 
This alteration has effected judicial interpretation in the context 
of television format submissions.  First, and immediately, any state 
law claims that are equivalent to rights protected under the 1976 
Act are preempted.18  That includes not only common law 
copyright, but also any property-based claims under state law such 
as conversion, misappropriation and quasi-contract.19  This left 
contract theory, either express or implied-in-fact, as the only viable 
claims to protect against plagiarism.20  Hence, in the television 
format setting, such as in the above example, the originators of the 
format are without legal recourse because what has been taken, 
namely, ideas, does not amount to copyright infringement.21 
Furthermore, where there is no relationship, either contractual or 
agency, between the parties, proving an extra element necessary to 
overcome preemption (beyond an understanding not to use the 
material) may be practically impossible.22  It is no wonder that 
faced with the futility of presenting a copyright infringement claim 
or a state law claim that would withstand federal copyright 
preemption, the producers chose instead to bring a pretextual claim 
for violations of the state boxing regulations.23 
 
 17 The Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2572 (1978) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 301 
(2000)).  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 
F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th Cir. 1997); Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 296, 301 
(1984) (“the federal statute applies so as to preempt any claim . . . based upon a common-
law copyright theory.”). 
 18 See, e.g., Berge, 104 F.3d at 1463; Klekas, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 301. 
 19 See discussion infra Part I.A.  See also Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection 
for Products of the Mind: An “Idea” Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 
764-73 (2006) (discussing judicial interpretation of preemption doctrine as it relates to 
novelty and concreteness). 
 20 Lionel S. Sobel, The Law of Ideas, Revisited, 1 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 9, 21-22 (1994); 
but see Glen L. Kulik, Copyright Preemption: Is This the End of Desny v. Wilder?, 21 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 29 (2000) (suggesting that preemption has eliminated implied-
in-fact contract claims for idea submission cases in California).  
 21 See, e.g., CBS Broad. Inc. v. ABC, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 8813 (LAP), 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20258 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2003) (denying preliminary injunction on a copyright 
infringement claim brought by the broadcaster and producer of Survivor against the 
broadcaster and producer of a similar program, I’m a Celebrity, Get Me Out of Here). 
 22 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 23 In April 2001 CBS and Burnett’s company, Survivor Productions brought suit 
against Fox Broadcasting alleging copyright infringement of Survivor by a similar 
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Recent case law at the circuit level has reaffirmed the efficacy 
of state law claims to withstand a preemption challenge in idea 
submission cases.24  However, the circumstances of these cases, 
from the advertising industry25 the feature film industry,26 and the 
toy industry27 are distinguishable from the circumstances of format 
submissions in television.28  This paper examines the case law 
concerning idea submissions with particular attention to television 
format submissions and suggests that a lack of enforcement against 
plagiarism, besides being frustrating for plaintiffs,29 also has 
economic consequences for broadcasters and distributors.  
Entitlement systems, even those established by contract, rely on 
enforcement to function.30  Without a reliable system of 
enforcement, acquirers of program ideas have no other choice, 
from an economic standpoint, but to act opportunistically, reducing 
incentives for innovation and reducing economic efficiency. 
Part I discusses copyright preemption of state law claims and 
the impact of preemption on the body of law termed “The Law of 
Ideas,” as applied to the entertainment industry.  Part II addresses 
the current viability of implied-in-fact contract claims and its 
impact on television format submissions.  Part III discusses the 
 
program, Boot Camp.  Survivor Prod. LLC v. Fox Broad. Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25512 (C.D. Cal. 2001).  Eventually the suit was dropped. Viacom Drops a Lawsuit 
Against Fox, NEW YORK TIMES, September 8, 2001 at C4. 
 24 See infra notes 23–25. 
 25 See, e.g., Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001); Katz 
Dochrermann & Epstein, Inc. v. Home Box Office, No. 97 CIV. 7763(TPG), 1999 WL 
179603 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999). 
 26 See, e.g., Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 27 See, e.g., Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
 28 See, e.g., Associated Artist Entm’t, Inc. v. Walt Disney Pictures, No. CV-95-00713-
AAH, 1999 WL 132196, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1999) (stating that an expectation of 
future business does not form an implied contract); Endemol Entm’t, B.V. v. Twentieth 
Television Inc., No. CV98-0608 ABC (BQRx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 at *12, 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998); Entous v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1160 
(C.D. Cal. 2001); Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 921, 944 (S.D. Tex. 2004). 
 29 See Glen L. Kulik, Copyright Preemption: Is This the End of Desny v. Wilder?, 21 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 29 (2000) (suggesting that preemption has eliminated implied-
in-fact contract claims for idea submission cases in California). 
 30 See generally Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
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likely effect of these legal outcomes on the television industry and 
concludes with the recommendation that the acquirers of 
programming would benefit from the formation of a voluntary 
collective rights organization for the administration and arbitration 
of format authorship disputes.  The Writers’ Guild of America 
(“WGA”) Script Registry, currently a passive resource, would be a 
one candidate to organize a dispute resolution system for the 
benefit of acquirers as well as purveyors of television formats. 
I. COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS 
This section discusses the Law of Ideas and the effect that 
copyright preemption has had on the viability of state law claims in 
idea submission cases. 
Copyright law offers little protection for television formats for 
three reasons.  First, copyright law protects expression, not ideas.31  
When copyrights in a television format have been asserted, courts 
have found in most cases, only a similarity in ideas or scenes a 
faire, and not a taking of the expression of those ideas.32  Second, 
the Copyright Act of 1976 protects unpublished works,33 while 
under the Copyright Act of 1909,34 unpublished works were the 
province of state common law copyright.35  This regime offered 
unpublished works such as treatments and proposals somewhat 
broader protection under state law.  Third, and most importantly, 
the Copyright Act of 1976 expressly preempts equivalent state law 
claims including common law copyright and any claim that is not 
qualitatively different from the rights protected under copyright, 
 
 31 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).  See, e.g., Beal v. Paramount Pictures, 806 F. Supp. 
963, 966 (N.D. Ga. 1992). 
 32 See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 523 F. Supp. 611, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981); CBS Broad. Inc. v. ABC, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 8813 (LAP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20258, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2003); Survivor Prods. LLC v. Fox Broad. Co., No. 
CV 01-3234 LGB (SHx), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25511, at *8–18 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 
2001). 
 33 See The Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2572 (1978) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 
301 (2000)). 
 34 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (1909) 
(current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–914 (2000)). 
 35 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (1909). 
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that is, the right to copy, distribute, make derivative works, 
perform or display.36 
When one attempts to sell an idea for a television program, the 
idea is inevitably memorialized in some form of writing submitted 
to a studio, network, or production entity.  Business is conducted 
this way in virtually every case.37  Defendants will argue that a 
plaintiff’s sole cause of action is for copyright infringement 
because anything reduced to writing is thereby copyrightable.  A 
defendant will remove the case to federal court, alleging the 
contract cause of action is a disguised copyright infringement 
claim, subject to federal court jurisdiction.  Once the case is in 
federal court, the defendant will move to dismiss the claim, 
contending it is preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976.38 
Under the earlier regime39, unpublished works were the 
province of state law under common law copyright.40  Under the 
1976 Act, Congress explicitly intended to create a single federal 
system of copyright protection preempting the state common law 
copyright.41  Section 301 states that all state claims that fall within 
 
 36 See The Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2546 (1978) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106 
(2000)). 
 37 See Good Ideas, supra note 10. 
38 See Kulik, Copyright Preemption supra note 29 
 39 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (1909) 
(current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–914 (2000)); see also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
supra note 15, § 1.01[A], at 1–4—1–8. 
 40 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 129–132 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5745–5746 (“[17 U.S.C.] [s]ection 301, one of the bedrock provisions of the bill, 
would accomplish a fundamental and significant change in the present law.  Instead of a 
dual system of ‘common law copyright’ for unpublished works and statutory copyright 
for published works, which has been the system in effect in the United States since the 
first copyright statute in 1790, the bill adopts a single system of Federal statutory 
copyright from creation.”). 
 41 Id. at 5745 
The intention of section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the 
common law or statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that 
extend to works coming within the scope of the Federal copyright law . . . 
[S]ection 301 is intended to be stated in the clearest and most unequivocal 
language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation of its 
unqualified intention that Congress shall act preemptively, and to avoid the 
development of any vague borderline areas between State and Federal 
protection. 
Id. 
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the “subject matter of copyright” as defined in sections 102 and 
103 of the Act, and assert “legal or equitable rights that are 
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope 
of copyright as specified in section 106 in works of authorship that 
are fixed in a tangible medium of expression,” are preempted 
under the Act. 42 
The effect of the unequivocal language in the statute and the 
strong statements in the Judiciary committee reports43 had an 
immediate effect on the courts’ analyses of state law claims under 
property theories including quasi-contract.44  The courts’ 
interpretation of the statute strictly limited but did not eliminate 
state law claims based on a relationship between the parties, such 
as express contract,45 implied contract46 or confidentiality.47  
However, from a practical standpoint, the careful writer who writes 
a detailed treatment, deposits a copy in the WGA Registry, and 
pitches the idea, but fails to establish an express agreement to be 
paid by the recipient if the idea is used, will most likely find his 
claims preempted by the 1976 Act.48 
A. The First Prong—Ideas Are Within the Subject Matter of 
Copyright 
Courts have applied section 301 by applying a two-prong test 
to determine preemption.49  Under the first prong of the test, 
material contained in a work of authorship fixed in a tangible 
medium will be considered within the subject matter of copyright 
even if that material would not itself qualify for copyright, such as 
 
 42 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000). 
 43 See supra notes 40 and 41. 
 44 See discussion infra Part I.C.1. 
 45 See discussion infra Part I.C.2.a. 
 46 See discussion infra Part I.C.2.b. 
 47 See discussion infra Part I.C.2.c. 
 48 Associated Artist Entm’t, Inc. v. Walt Disney Pictures, No. CV-95-00713-AAH, 
1999 WL 132196, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1999).  But see Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 
92 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 270 (Cal. 1956)). 
 49 See, e.g., Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998); Kregos v. 
Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656, 666 (2d Cir. 1993). 
RUBIN 3/17/2006  11:08 AM 
2006] TELEVISION FORMATS 673 
information,50 titles51 or ideas.52  Under the second prong, called 
the “extra element”53 or “equivalency,” test54 the court looks to 
whether the state law claim asserts rights that are “qualitatively 
different” from those protected under the Copyright Act, i.e., 
reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance or display.55 
Occasionally plaintiffs in idea submission cases have crafted 
their pleadings to describe their work as ideas rather than 
expression, in an attempt to place ideas outside of the subject 
matter of copyright, so as to withstand the first prong of the 
preemption test.56  However, the Second, Fourth, Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits have held that the Act’s subject matter is broader 
than the scope of its protections.57 
The implication of this doctrine in the television format 
context, and discussed in Endemol v. Twentieth Television,58 is that 
if the source of what was copied was embodied in a tangible 
medium such as a videotape pilot, series episodes from an existing 
show, or a written treatment, the material is included in the 
 
 50 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (“The fact that portions of the Ford memoirs may consist of uncopyrightable 
material . . . does not take the work as a whole outside the subject matter protected by the 
Act.”). 
 51 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468, 
1475 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that “Miami Vice” title although not copyrightable 
was within subject matter of copyright as part of the series). 
 52 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 
1453, 1465 (4th Cir. 1997); Markogianis v. Burger King Corp., No. 95 CIV. 4627(JFK), 
1997 WL 167113, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1997). 
 53 See Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985); see also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, § 1.01[B], at 1–14 – 1–15. 
 54 See Wrench, 256 F.3d at 453. 
 55 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 56 See, e.g., Berge, 104 F.3d at 1463. 
 57 Second circuit: Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc. 105 F.3d 841, 849 (2d Cir. 
1997); Fourth circuit: Berge, 104 F.3d at 1463; Sixth circuit: Wrench, 256 F.3d at 455; 
Seventh Circuit: ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[o]ne 
function of § 301(a) is to prevent states from giving special protection to works of 
authorship that Congress has decided should be in the public domain, which it can 
accomplish only if ‘subject matter of copyright’ includes all works of a type covered by 
sections 102 and 103, even if federal law does not afford protection to them.”). 
 58 Endemol Entm’t, B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., No. CV98-0608 ABC (BQRx), 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998). 
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definition of copyright subject matter.59  However, if what is taken 
is only ideas underlying that copyrighted work, that does not 
constitute copyright infringement.60  This distinction between 
“subject matter” as listed in § 102 (a)61 and “scope of copyright” 
referred to in § 301(a)62 leaves the copying of ideas embodied in a 
written proposal or a finished program without protection under 
copyright, and with protection under very limited circumstances 
under state law. 
The leading case applying this doctrine was Berge v. Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama.63  In Berge, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff on her claim for “conversion of intellectual 
property.”64  The plaintiff, the author of an unpublished research 
paper on epidemiology, alleged plagiarism by a subsequent author 
on the same subject.65  The plaintiff claimed that it was only her 
“ideas and methods” that had been stolen.66  The court noted that 
the dissertation was in written form and thus subject to copyright 
 
 59 See generally id. 
 60 Berge, 104 F.3d at 1463. 
 61 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000):  
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.  Works of 
authorship include the following categories: 
(1) literary works; 
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 
(7) sound recordings; and 
(8) architectural works. 
 62 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000): “[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any 
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 
in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within 
the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 . . . .” 
 63 United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 
(4th Cir. 1997) (holding the Copyright Act preempts a claim under Alabama law for 
conversion of ideas embodied in plaintiff’s unpublished doctoral dissertation). 
 64 Id. at 1455. 
 65 Id. at 1456. 
 66 Id. at 1463. 
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protection.67  The Court regarded the author’s argument, that her 
“ideas and methods” were excluded from the scope of copyright 
protections, as a “fallacious interpretation of the Copyright Act.”68 
According to the court, the plaintiff wanted “to argue that ideas 
embodied in a work covered by the Copyright Act do not fall 
within the scope of the Act because the Act specifically excludes 
them from protection.  But scope and protection are not 
synonyms.”69 
In the genre of scholarly works, the Berge decision makes 
sense.  The plaintiff, in writing her dissertation, had utilized a 
database at the University of Alabama and had been supervised by 
experts in the field located at that institution where the pertinent 
research had been conducted for 15 years before her arrival.70  It 
was over-reaching for her to claim exclusive rights to the “ideas 
and methods” that she employed.  The principle of the 
idea/expression dichotomy assures that an author cannot take ideas 
out of circulation just because she employs them, especially when 
those ideas are the building blocks upon which scientific research 
may be advanced.71 
However, when a court applies this doctrine to television 
format submission cases, the result can be illogical.  In Endemol v. 
Twentieth Television,72 the district court found preemption of an 
implied contract claim73 where the defendant, a potential licensee 
of a television format, declined to enter an agreement with the 
licensor of a television format and subsequently duplicated the 
format.74  The plaintiff brought claims for both copyright 
 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.  Judge Ervin joins the ranks of judicial poets when he coins the phrase: “the 
shadow actually cast by the Act’s preemption is notably broader than the wing of its 
protection,” which follows the above quote. 
 70 See id. at 1455–56. 
 71 See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (discussing distinction between “building block” ideas and “opinion” ideas). 
 72 Endemol Entm’t, B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., No. CV98-0608 ABC (BQRx), 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998). 
 73 Id. at *17. 
 74 Id. at *3.  “Forgive and Forget” television show produced following pitch of format 
for “Forgive Me”. Id. at *4. 
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infringement and breach of an implied-in-fact contract.75  In 
arguing that ideas were not within the subject matter of copyright, 
the plaintiff asserted that Berge was inapplicable because there the 
plaintiff could not show copying, and in Berge the claim was for 
conversion rather than implied contract.76  The court found the 
distinction to be one of fact and that “the relevant question before 
this Court is one of law,” that ideas are within the subject matter of 
copyright and therefore the first prong of the preemption test is 
satisfied.77  The factual distinction is important.  The scientific 
methodology that Berge employed in her paper is closer to the type 
of ideas that the Copyright Act intended to exclude from 
protection,78 as compared to the creative ideas embodied in a 
format treatment.79  Therefore, a plaintiff who can neither maintain 
a copyright claim, and whose claim under state law is preempted 
by an overly broad interpretation of preemption doctrine, is left 
with no legal recourse to a flagrant imitation of his format. 
The only conceivable situation that might arise where an idea 
does not fall within the subject matter of copyright would be an 
oral pitch that had never been written down.  Because formats are 
almost invariably embodied in a written treatment, they satisfy the 
first prong of the test even though the ideas contained therein are 
not themselves copyrightable. 
B. The Second Prong—The Extra Element Test 
Section 106 of the Act provides that an owner of a copyright 
has exclusive rights to undertake and to authorize the reproduction, 
preparation of derivative works, distribution of copies of the 
copyrighted work by sale or by transfer of ownership, 
performance, and the public display of the copyrighted work.80 To 
survive preemption, a state law cause of action arising from the 
 
 75 Id. at *1. 
 76 Id. at *10. 
 77 Id. at. *10–11. 
 78 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 129–132 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5670. 
 79 See generally, e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 
F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 80 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
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submission of an idea must include an “extra element” (in addition 
to or instead of the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution, 
or display) that “changes the nature of the action so that it is 
qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim.”81 To 
survive preemption, the second prong requires that the state law 
claim “must derive from something beyond the alleged 
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work, and must protect rights 
qualitatively different from the assertion of copyright rights.”82 
The difficulty in television format submission cases is that 
generally the plaintiff asserts that the defendant, by inviting the 
proposal, has impliedly promised not use the concepts contained in 
the pitch, until and unless some agreement is reached.  However, 
the promise not to accept the benefit of a copyright work is not 
qualitatively different from an infringement claim and will not 
withstand preemption.83 
The question is what does constitute the extra element 
necessary to make a state law claim qualitatively different from a 
copyright claim and therefore withstand preemption? 
C. State Law Claims Asserting Qualitatively Different Rights 
In practice, state law protection against unauthorized copying 
of ideas is grounded in contract and agency law.  A plaintiff must 
prove that either a contract or confidential relationship exists to 
satisfy the extra element requirement and avoid preemption.84 
 
 81 Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 
see also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, § 1.01[B], at 1–14 – 1–15. 
 82 Trenton v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1416, 1428 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
 83 Endemol Entm’t, B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., No. CV98-0608 ABC (BQRx), 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 at *16, (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998). 
 84 A number of other legal theories that have been consistently preempted include: (1) 
misrepresentation under the Lanham Act § 43(a): Kienzle v. Capital Cities/Am. Broad. 
Co., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 432, 438–39 (E.D. Mich. 1991); (2) trade dress under the Lanham 
Act: RDF Media Ltd. v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 372 F. Supp.2d 556 (C.D. Cal. 2005); (3) 
common law unfair competition: Survivor Prod. LLC v. Fox Broad. Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25512 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1306–07 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); and (4) interference with contract or prospective business advantage: 
Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (C.D. Cal. 
1987). 
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Until 1978,85 unpublished works were protected by a body of 
state law referred to as “common law copyright,” and published 
works were protected by federal copyright.86  While copyright only 
protects expression, not ideas,87 another body of law has developed 
to protect works of the mind.  This is the “The Law of Ideas,”88 
consisting of five categories of state law claims that might offer 
some protection where ideas, rather than the concrete expression of 
ideas, have been copied.89  Those claims are: property theory, 
quasi-contract, confidentiality, express contract, and implied-in-
fact contract.90  Together, copyright protection and the Law of 
Ideas, complemented each other and constituted the law of 
plagiarism.91 
The Law of Ideas developed in the 1950’s in California.  The 
general rule in most jurisdictions at the time was that “ideas are 
‘free as the air.’”92  In contrast, prior to 1947, a California statute 
protected any “product of the mind,” by granting to it’s author 
“exclusive ownership” therein, in addition to the exclusive 
ownership of the expression of the idea under copyright.93  Some 
 
 85 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 
106 (2000)). 
 86 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, Overview, at OV–3. 
 87 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (“In no case does copyright protection . . . extend to any 
idea . . .”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (“Unlike a patent, a copyright gives 
no exclusive right . . protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea 
itself.”). 
 88 The term comes from the title of Melville Nimmer’s article, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 119 (1954). 
 89 See generally id. 
 90 Id.; See generally 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, §§ 16.02–16.06, at 16–5 – 
16–49. 
 91 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy’s Desk Encyclopedia of Intellectual Property 249 
(defining plagiarism as the “copying of ideas or expression of another author and using 
them as one’s own work.”). 
 92 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 93 CAL. CIV. CODE § 980 (1872) (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 980 (West 
2006)).  As originally enacted in 1872 the section provided that: 
The author of any product of the mind, whether it is an invention, or a 
composition in letters or art, or a design, with or without delineation, or other 
graphical representation, has an exclusive ownership therein, and in the 
representation or expression thereof, which continues so long as the product 
and the representations or expressions thereof made by him remain in his 
possession. 
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California decisions involving pre-1947 claims on protection for 
unpublished works treated plot ideas and radio formats as a 
property entitlement.94  In 1947, the California legislature passed 
an amendment eliminating this unique extension of common law 
copyright.95  As a result, the California Supreme Court took an 
opportunity during the period 1950 to 1956 to define the legal 
framework in idea submission cases.96  In 1954, a young attorney 
named Melville Nimmer, working on behalf of Paramount 
Pictures, wrote an article detailing the state law claims, which 
might protect against the unauthorized use of an idea.97  Ironically, 
Paramount was the very studio that was denied a motion for 
summary judgment when a writer claimed that director Billy 
Wilder misappropriated his script idea for the film, “Ace in the 
Hole.”98  That case, Desny v. Wilder,99 has remained the seminal 
case for implied contract claims in idea submission cases.100  The 
 
 94 Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 221 P.2d 95 (Cal. 1950) (movie “The Ghost Ship” 
infringed plot idea of the play “The Man and His Shadow”); Kovacs v. Mutual Broad. 
Sys., Inc., 221 P.2d 108 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (radio giveaway program protected); 
Burtis v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc., 256 P.2d 933, 939 (Cal. 1953) (movie “She Wrote 
the Book” not found substantially similar to an unpublished story, however the court 
stated that “under the earlier form of the statute, a ‘theme’ or ‘idea’ was protectible,  
although at common law and under the 1947 amendment . . . protection is extended only 
to the ‘representation or expression’ of a composition.”). 
 95 CAL. CIV. CODE § 980, ch. 1107 (1947) (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 980 
(West 2006)).  In 1947, the section was rewritten to declare that: “The author or 
proprietor of any composition in letters or art has an exclusive ownership in the 
representation or expression thereof as against all persons except on who originally and 
independently creates the same or a similar composition.” 
 96 See Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 221 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1950); Weitzenkorn v. 
Lesser, 256 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1953); Kurlan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 256 P.2d 962 
(Cal. 1953); Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956). 
 97 See generally Melville B. Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (1954) 
[hereinafter The Law of Ideas]. 
 98 See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d at 260 (“O’Melveny & Myers, W. B. Carman, 
William W. Alsup, Everett B. Clary, Philip F. Westbrook, Jr., Louis W. Myers, Sidney 
Justin and Melville B. Nimmer, for Respondents.”).  The Desny opinion cited Nimmer’s 
article with approval in finding against his client (“It may be that plaintiff’s concessions 
and arguments, in the light of the pleadings and evidence, are intended to suggest that 
there is some nebulous middle area between an abstract idea and a literary composition, 
wherein the idea has been cast in ‘concrete’ form but not ‘concrete’ enough to constitute 
a literary property.”) Id. at 263; (“This accords with the general weight of authority.”). Id. 
at 266. 
 99 Desny, 299 P.2d 257. 
 100 See discussion supra Part I.C. and discussion infra Part II.A. 
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legal theories arising out of cases during this period101 fall under 
five headings: property theory, quasi-contract, confidentiality, 
express contract, and implied contract.102 
1. Property Theories 
Property theories, including quasi-contract, no longer provide 
protection for ideas due to federal copyright preemption 
doctrine.103  “[A]n essential element of . . . property is the legal 
right to exclude others from enjoying it.”104  The policy rationale 
behind the exclusion of ideas from copyright protection, that an 
author can not claim a monopoly over ideas, even her original 
ideas, as separate from the expression of those ideas, precludes the 
recognition of a property interest in ideas even if that property 
theory were other than copyright.105  However, such theories 
continue to be asserted occasionally in idea submission cases106 
and recognized in the literature.107  Cases that hold that a property 
right exists in ideas predate the 1947 amendment to § 980 of the 
California Civil code,108 or suggest so only in dicta.109  The 
California Supreme Court eliminated any doubt on this point with 
 
 101 See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 102 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, §§ 16.02–16.06, at 16–5 – 16–49. 
 103 See discussion supra Part I.A.– I.B. 
 104 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 105 See Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947, 956 (Cal. 1953) (holding that there is no 
property interest in “basic dramatic core” after 1947 amendment).  “Tarzan’s Magic 
Fountain” was allegedly plagiarized from plaintiff’s story “Tarzan in the Land of Eternal 
Youth.” See id. at 950. But see Golding v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 193 P. 2d 153 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (holding the opposite under the pre-1947 Act). 
 106 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 
1453 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 107 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, § 16.02. 
 108 Compare Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 221 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1950) (finding 
that the author of a radio program format had a property right in the fruits of his labor).  
Id. at 79. with Kurlan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 256 P.2d 962 (Cal. 1953) (holding 
that the plaintiff was entitled to provethat the defendants had expressly or impliedly 
promised to pay for the use of plaintiff’s material.). 
 109 Cases during the same period from other jurisdictions may seem to grant that a 
property right exists in a radio format: Belt v. Hamilton Nat. Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689 
(D.C. Cir. 1952); or television format: Silver v. Television City, Inc., 215 A.2d 335, 338 
(Pa. Super. 1965); however, this is merely dicta.  In these cases the facts are consistent 
with implied contract. 
RUBIN 3/17/2006  11:08 AM 
2006] TELEVISION FORMATS 681 
its decision in Desny v. Wilder when it said, “it is clear that 
California does not now accord individual property type protection 
to abstract ideas.”110  Likewise under the 1976 Act, copyright does 
not extend to ideas.111  If an idea has been fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression and therefore would qualify as a “work of 
authorship,”112 then any state law claims based on a theory that 
ideas are property would be preempted by federal copyright law.113  
For these reasons, courts have dismissed conversion of idea and 
misappropriation of idea claims.114  Consistent with this policy, 
courts have dismissed quasi-contract claims for the unauthorized 
use of ideas, holding that the proof necessary to prevail on a quasi-
contract theory is the same as that necessary to prevail in a 
copyright infringement action.115  Following the 1976 Act, quasi-
contract claims are not common, but when asserted, they are 
dismissed on preemption grounds.116 
2. Contract and Agency Theories 
Claims predicated upon a relationship between the parties, i.e., 
express contract, implied-in-fact contract, and confidential 
 
 110 Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 265 (Cal. 1956). 
 111 The Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2544 (1978) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102 
(2000)). 
 112 17 U.S.C § 102 (2000). 
 113 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (“[W]orks of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium 
of expression . . . come within the subject matter of copyright . . .”). 
 114 See, e.g., Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287, 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (“In the 
absence of a protectible property there can be no conversion of an idea.”).  See also Mann 
v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 525–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Whitfield v. 
Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1984); Meta-Film Assocs., Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 
1346, 1355 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp 823, 833–35 (N.D. Ill. 
1989). 
 115 See, e.g., Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1953); Kurlan v. Columbia 
Broad. Sys., Inc., 256 P.2d 962 (Cal. 1953); see also Mann, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 525; Klekas 
v. EMI Films, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
 116 See, e.g., Del Madera Prop. v. Rhodes & Gardener, Inc. 820 F.2d 973, 976–77 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Wolff v. Inst. of Elec. & Elec. Eng’rs, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 66, 70 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991); No. 85 Civ. 10017 (CSH), 1988 WL 18932, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1988); 
Ronald Litoff, Ltd. v Am. Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 
Universal City Studios v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 615 F. Supp. 838, 856–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 
see also 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, § 16.03[B] at 16–14. 
RUBIN 3/17/2006  11:08 AM 
682 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16 
relationship, continue to be viable in idea submission cases.117  
Historically, these theories have been successfully applied in 
television treatment cases.118 
a) Express Contract 
Broadcasters and distributors do not pay for pitches, nor do 
they generally promise to pay if any of the ideas are used.  On the 
contrary, most require the signing of a waiver for unsolicited 
submissions.119  The idea purveyor invests time and energy in 
creating a proposal or script in the hope that the concept will get 
picked up, in which case paid work will follow.120 
 
 117 See generally Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., Inc., No. CV-00-02279 CAS JWJX, 2000 
WL 979664 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 
(6th Cir. 2001); Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004); Nadel v. 
Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2000); Katz Dochrermann & 
Epstein, Inc. v. Home Box Office, No. 97 CIV. 7763(TPG), 1999 WL 179603 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 31, 1999); Stewart v. World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc., No. 03 CV 2468 RLC, 
2005 WL 66890 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2005). 
 118 See e.g., Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., Inc., No. CV-00-02279 CAS JWJX, 2000 WL 
979664, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000); Kurlan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 256 P.2d 
962, 970 (Cal. 1953); Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 525-26 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1982); Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1966); Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).. 
 119 The release form is a tool employed by producers and signed by the writer prior to a 
submission.  The form waives the writer’s right to sue the producer.  The standard form 
states, “I will not assert against you . . . any claim based on plagiarism, infringement, 
confidential relationship, implied contract, unfair competition or otherwise arising out of 
any alleged used by you of  my treatment or screenplay.”  The same release then states, 
“notwithstanding my release . . . in the event a court . . . shall find that you have 
wrongfully appropriated my screenplay from me and that the screenplay is original with 
me . . . then I will suffer no damages in excess of $1000.”  The validity of releases has 
been questioned, but the continued use of the release forms evidences their value to 
producers.  See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT  supra note 15, § 16.05[C].  Networks 
discourage unsolicited submissions by either claiming that submission will be discarded 
unopened, see  FOX Broadcasting Co. website available at  
http://www.fox.com/community/askfox/answer11.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006); or 
asserting that the unsolicited submission of creative ideas somehow waives any claim the 
author might have, see NBC website available at http://www.nbc.com/Footer/ 
Contact_Us/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 120 Option contracts with writers or individual producers are occasionally used to lock 
up a property for a period of time, but this is more common in the feature film industry.  
See, e.g., Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C706083, 1990 WL 357611, at *1 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 1990). 
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Alternatively, and more commonly, if a producer has 
developed a television format and is actively seeking distribution 
as in “The Contender” example above, the parties are actually 
engaged in negotiating a contract for delivery of the completed 
program, not for the treatment.121  The format is merely the 
blueprint for the series and if negotiations break down, neither 
party will be bound.122 
Express contract claims for idea submissions are more likely to 
arise in feature film123 or software industries,124 where the practice 
of paying for such proposals may be more common.  In the 
television industry, however, express contract disputes would most 
likely arise only where parties have agreed to a producer, writer or 
development agreement.125  When such claims do arise, a plaintiff 
is likely to demonstrate that the rights asserted under the contract 
are qualitatively different than a promise not to accept the benefit 
of a copyrighted work. 
For example, in Chesler/Perlmutter Productions, Inc. v. 
Fireworks Entertainment, Inc.,126 Chesler had pitched to Fireworks 
a dramatic series entitled “Gitana,” featuring a sixteenth century 
action heroine.127  When Fireworks produced a similar program, 
“Queen of Swords,” Chesler filed suit in state court alleging breach 
of express and implied contract.128  Firework removed the case to 
federal court by alleging that the state claims were preempted by 
copyright.129 
Chesler alleged that over and above pitching the idea orally, 
Fireworks asked for a written treatment which Chesler supplied.130  
 
 121 See generally Endemol Entm’t, B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., No. CV98-0608 
ABC (BQRx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998). 
 122 Id. 
 123 See, e.g., Buchwald, 1990 WL 357611, at *6. 
 124 See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1125 (3d 
Cir. 1986). 
 125 See, e.g., Chesler/Perlmutter Prods., Inc. v. Fireworks Entm’t, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 
1050, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 126 Chesler/Perlmutter Prods., Inc. v. Fireworks Entm’t, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1050 
(C.D. Cal 2001). 
 127 Id. at 1054. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 1053. 
 130 Id. at 1054. 
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In addition, there were ongoing discussions between the parties 
concerning development, production, financing, compensation, and 
an exchange of budgets.131  Chesler also sent a draft agreement that 
detailed the compensation for production fees, hiring of writers, 
and share of profits.132 
Based on these allegations, the U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California found the claims for breach of 
express contract and breach of a partially written and partially oral 
contract.133  The claims were not preempted because the alleged 
terms, e.g., specific amounts and times of payment, selection of 
Chesler’s writer, employment of Chesler’s employee as producer, 
and Chesler’s right of consultation, “go beyond a ‘promise not to 
accept the benefit of a copyright work.”134 
 Although the court acknowledged that the claim for breach 
of implied contract was a “closer question,” the court found 
dispositive the allegations that the parties reached an actual 
agreement and that the relationship between the parties continued 
thereafter.135  These allegations satisfied the “extra element” 
requirement such that the claim exceeded the exclusive rights 
protected by the Act.136  Similarly, the allegation that Fireworks 
breached an explicit promise to pay certain sums of money and 
was unjustly enriched by retaining those specific sums was held to 
be sufficient to provide the requisite “extra element.”137 
b) Implied-in-Fact Contract 
The only difference between the implied-in-fact contract and 
the express contract is that the offer and acceptance in implied-in-
fact contracts is determined from circumstances rather than what 
the parties verbalize.138  This could be the behavior of the parties 
 
 131 Id.. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 1059 (quoting Endemol Entm’t, B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., No. CV98-
0608 ABC (BQRx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998)) 
 135 Chesler, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 1059. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, § 16.05, at 16–31. 
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indicating their intentions to enter into a contract, or circumstances 
implied from industry practice.139  The circumstances that can 
support the inference that the recipient of a format submission 
intended to pay for the idea if used, is essential to avoiding 
preemption. 
The California Supreme Court first recognized the use of 
contract law for idea submission cases in Stanley v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System.140  The plaintiff in that case had created a 
format for a radio program which he submitted to CBS, and which, 
he claimed, CBS copied in producing a similar radio program.141 
The plaintiff contended that he had an implied agreement with 
CBS that required the network to pay him if it used his format.142 
The jury awarded him $35,000, and the judgment was affirmed by 
the California Supreme Court.143 Because the radio program at 
issue was first broadcast in 1945, the case was decided based on 
California law before the 1947 amendment.144  Therefore, the court 
did not consider the legal consequences of the 1947 amendment in 
the opinion, so the case’s significance is limited.145 
However, in his dissenting opinion in Stanley, Justice Traynor 
wrote an exposition on the law of ideas.146  There, he explained 
why “[t]he policy that precludes protection of an abstract idea by 
copyright does not prevent its protection by contract”147 and he 
further explained how contract law principles ought to be applied 
in protecting ideas.148  Six years later, Justice Traynor’s dissent in 
Stanley was “accepted as the law of California” by a majority of 
the California Supreme Court in Desny v. Wilder.149 
 
 139 See, e.g., Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 260 (Cal. 1956). 
 140 Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1950). 
 141 Id. at 74. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 CAL. CIV. CODE § 980 (1872); see supra note 91. 
 145 See Lionel S. Sobel, A Practical Guide to Copyright Ownership and Transfer: The 
Differences Between Licenses, Assignments and Works Made for Hire and Suggestions 
for Analyzing which One is “Best” For a Particular Transaction, ENT. L. REP., Feb. 
1984 3, 7 (1984). 
 146 See Stanley, 221 P.2d at 85 (Traynor, J., dissenting). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 266 (Cal. 1956). 
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Desny v. Wilder was the case in which an aspiring writer 
named Victor Desny sued Billy Wilder and Paramount Pictures, 
alleging that in producing the movie Ace in the Hole, they had 
used a story he had submitted to Wilder.150 Desny had called 
Wilder’s office asking to meet with Wilder, to pitch a 65-page 
script based on the story of Floyd Collins, a man who had been 
trapped in a cave for two weeks during the 20’s.151  When Wilder’s 
secretary heard how long the script was, she told Desny that 
Wilder would never read such a long submission and that if he sent 
it, the script department would write up a synopsis for Wilder to 
read.152  Desny said he would prefer to write the synopsis 
himself.153  A few days later he called again and the secretary 
asked him to read it to her over the phone so that she could take it 
down in shorthand.154  In that phone conversation, Desny 
explained that he had put a great deal of work into the story and 
was presenting it for sale.155  The secretary told him that if they 
used it, “naturally we will pay you for it.”156  The film followed the 
storyline in the synopsis and included a fictional episode which 
appeared in the synopsis and which the court found to be original 
and novel.157  Desny v. Wilder became the seminal case in the 
application of contract theory for idea submission cases. 
The mere submission of an idea however, does not give rise to 
an implied contract.158  Desny v. Wilder held that two 
circumstances must exist, either before or at the time of disclosure, 
for an agreement to be implied.159  First, that the purveyor of the 
idea has set a condition to reveal the idea only if the recipient 
agrees to pay for it if used.160  Second, the recipient, knowing the 
condition before he knows the idea, voluntarily accepts the 
 
 150 Id. at 260–61. 
 151 Id. at 262. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 262–63. 
 158 Id. at 270. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
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disclosure, and then, finding it valuable, uses it.161  Desny also 
makes clear that just because an idea turns out to be valuable does 
not imply a contract.162  Subsequent demands following an 
unconditioned disclosure, even if the recipient used the idea for 
profit, do not give rise to an implied promise to pay for the idea.163  
The idea purveyor must strike his deal before pitching the idea.164  
Desny was entitled to a trial on his implied-in-fact contract claim 
because he conditioned his pitch on receiving the reasonable value 
of it if it was used, and Wilder’s secretary thereupon reassured him 
and assented to the disclosure.165 
Following Desny v. Wilder, courts in California166 and other 
states167 expanded on the implied-in-fact contract doctrine.  These 
courts found that an implied or express ‘promise to pay for an idea 
if it was used,’ was sufficient to maintain an action for breach of an 
implied contract, and that such a promise constituted the additional 
element needed to survive copyright preemption.168 
Often, circumstances do not so neatly support the inferences 
necessary to finding an implied-in-fact contract.169  Unlike an 
express contract, where the elements of contract are expressed in 
words, an implied-in-fact contract requires the action of the parties 
to justify the inference that an agreement has been sufficiently 
established.170 
 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 273–75. 
 166 Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 780–782 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); see also 
Kurlan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 256 P.2d 962, 970 (Cal. 1953) (reversing dismissal 
where plaintiff claimed compensation, based “upon a contract implied in fact from trade 
customs, practices and usages,” for the use of an idea for a television program).  See also 
Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 525-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); 
Blaustein v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Donahue v. Ziv 
Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (Underwater 
Legion against Sea Hunt); Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). 
 167 See, e.g., Curtis v. Time, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 505, 506 (D.D.C. 1957). 
 168 Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 169 See, e.g., Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Faris v. 
Engberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 198 Cal. 
Rptr. 296 (Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
 170 Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 377 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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For example, in Fischer v. Viacom International, Inc.,171 the 
creator of a team of animated characters, which served as the basis 
for his unpublished manuscript and a published collection of comic 
strips, approached Nickelodeon (a cable network owned by 
Viacom) about creating a series based on his characters.172  He 
alleged that Nickelodeon expressed interest and encouraged him to 
develop the show concept.173  Subsequently Nickelodeon 
developed “Blue’s Clues” which Fischer claimed was based on the 
characters he presented.174 
The District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed 
Fischer’s implied contract claim finding that the “alleged contract 
did not regulate the parties’ conduct beyond the mere use of 
Fischer’s ideas.”175  This claim, according to the court, was 
equivalent to rights protected under copyright and therefore 
preempted.176 
The disclosure of the idea, in itself, does not justify 
compensation to the plaintiff just because the person to whom he 
disclosed the idea subsequently uses it.177  As the Desny opinion 
states, “[t]he idea man who blurts out his idea without having first 
made his bargain has no one but himself to blame for the loss of 
his bargaining power.”178  The seller must clearly communicate 
that he is disclosing the idea on the condition that the buyer will 
pay for it if it is used.179  If the buyer then accepts the idea, courts 
should find that a contract exists between the parties.180 
c) Breach of Confidence 
A breach of confidence, that is the disclosure of an idea to a 
third party by the recipient of the idea after expressly or impliedly 
 
 171 Fischer v. Viacom International, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d. 535 (D. Md. 2000). 
 172 Id. at 537. 
 173 Id. at 538. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 542. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 544. 
 178 Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 270 (Cal. 1956). 
 179 Id. 
 180 See, e.g., Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying California 
law); Grosso v. Miramax 383 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004); Desny, 299 P.2d at 270. 
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agreeing to treat the idea ‘in confidence’ is equivalent to a breach 
of contract.181  The Central District of California court has found 
the understanding not to disclose an idea to be an extra element 
that takes a breach of confidence claim outside the scope of 
copyright. 182 
In Metrano v. Fox Broadcasting Co.,183 Art Metrano, an actor, 
proposed a format for a series entitled “Beyond Belief” to several 
producers including Katie Face Productions.184  Katie Face then 
arranged a pitch meeting with the defendants.185 Following the 
pitch meeting, Fox informed Metrano that they were not interested 
in “Beyond Belief.”186  Three years later, Fox aired a series, 
“Guinness World Records: Prime Time” that the plaintiff claimed 
utilized the same format as his proposed series.187  The defendant 
successfully removed the action based on copyright preemption 
and then moved to dismiss Metrano’s state law claims.188  The 
district court, citing Endemol189 dismissed the implied contract 
claim.190 The court, however, allowed the plaintiff to go forward 
on his breach of confidence claim.191  The court held that the fact 
that Metrano proposed the show to several other producers and 
registered the treatment with the WGA did not constitute public 
disclosure, as each of those meetings could also be construed as 
confidential.192 This may offer some glimmer of hope to plaintiffs 
 
 181 See generally Faris v. Engberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Landsberg 
v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 182 Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., Inc., No. CV-00-02279 CAS JWJX, 2000 WL 979664, 
at *19 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000) (finding that the understanding with the recipient of the 
idea for a television format “Beyond Belief” would not be disclosed constituted the 
“extra element” necessary to bring the claim outside of copyright preemption).  See also 
Berkla v. Corel Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1151 (E.D. Cal. 1999). 
 183 Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., Inc., No. CV-00-02279 CAS JWJX, 2000 WL 979664 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000). 
 184 Id. at *1. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at *2. 
 189 Endemol Entm’t, B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., No. CV98-0608 ABC (BQRx), 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998). 
 190 Metrano, 2000 WL 979664, at *6. 
 191 Id. at *6. 
 192 Id. at *8. 
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in overcoming the second prong of the preemption test when the 
circumstances lend themselves to breach of confidence claim. 
In the case of Burnett, DreamWorks and NBC mentioned in the 
introduction, the parties wanted to prevent Fox from going forward 
with its version of a boxing reality show.193  If they had pleaded 
breach of confidence or breach of implied contract, an injunction 
would not have been available because a breach of confidence is 
limited to the remedies available in a breach of contract.194 
Confidential relationship theory is also included in the category 
of state claims protecting ideas.195  However, it is only applicable 
where a trust arrangement already exists between the plaintiff and 
another person196 such as an agent197 or an employee198 who shares 
the idea with a third party who then exploits the idea.199 Where the 
person who originally disclosed the idea had no contact with the 
third person who eventually used it, there is no privity of contract 
and courts have held that no contract exists between them, not even 
an implied contract.200  On the other hand, the third person who 
eventually used the idea could be liable if he knew of that 
confidential relationship, and that it was breached by the disclosure 
of the idea to him.201 
 
 193 Paulsen, supra note 5. 
 194 Metrano, 2000 WL 979664, at *8. 
 195 See, e.g., USM Corp. v. Tremco Inc., 710 F. Supp 1140, 1142 (N.D. Ohio 1988) 
(addressing the confidential relationship theory as a basis for legal protection of trade 
secrets). 
 196 See, e.g., Blaustein v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 336 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). 
 197 See, e.g., Davies v. Krasna, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705 (Cal. 1975). 
 198 See, e.g., Ralph Andrews Prods. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 271 Cal. Rptr. 797, 
801–03 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that purchaser of idea from former employee 
of another company may be liable to that company if purchaser knew or should have 
known that employee stole the idea from the former employer). 
 199 See, e.g., Thompson v. California Brewing Co., 310 P.2d 436, 439–41 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1957); USM Corp. v. Tremco Inc., 710 F. Supp 1140, 1142–1143 (N.D. Ohio 1988) 
(“the ‘confidential relationship’ theory imposes a duty on a knowingly wrongful third 
party”.). 
 200 Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 139–41 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1966). 
 201 See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, § 16.07 at 16–51; Davies, 121 Cal. Rptr. 
at 710–12; Thompson, 310 P.2d 436 at 440-42. But see Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker 
Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1214–15 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
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II. THE QUESTIONABLE VIABILITY OF STATE LAW CLAIMS 
Within the past decade202 federal courts throughout the country 
have grappled with the factual circumstances that sustain state law 
claims for the unauthorized use of ideas embodied in copyrightable 
works based on implied-in-fact contract.203  An examination of the 
case law indicates no general rule for preemption of implied-in-
fact contract claims based on the submission of ideas.  The 
outcome depends on “the precise contract right being asserted.”204  
For example, if the expectation of the parties is not the direct sale 
of the ideas but rather that, should the idea prove workable, the 
parties will enter into negotiation on a producer or writer 
contract,205 then the “extra element” test fails and the implied-in-
fact contract claim will be preempted.206  Because pitches are 
commonly taken informally or without solicitation on the part of 
the recipient, it is the rare case where a recipient has, pre-
disclosure, expressed or implied by his actions, a promise to pay 
 
 202 Berge in 1997 looks like the first Court of Appeals case that found preemption 
because ideas are within the scope of copyright but not within its protection.  Del 
Madiera in 1987 used the 2-prong analysis but the copyrighted work was a map and the 
uncopyrightable material was information.  See also Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 
Inc. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 203 Alabama: United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 
1453 (4th Cir. 1997); California: Endemol Entm’t, B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., No. 
CV98-0608 ABC (BQRx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998), 
Associated Artist Entm’t, Inc. v. Walt Disney Pictures, No. CV-95-00713-AAH, 1999 
WL 132196 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1999), Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., Inc., No. CV-00-02279 
CAS JWJX, 2000 WL 979664 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000), Chesler/Perlmutter Prods., Inc. 
v. Fireworks Entm’t, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2001), Grosso v. Miramax 
Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004), Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 
1209 (9th Cir. 1998); New York: Markogianis v. Burger King Corp., No. 95 CIV. 
4627(JFK), 1997 WL 167113, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1997), Stewart v. World Wrestling 
Fed’n Entm’t, Inc., No. 03 CV 2468 RLC, 2005 WL 66890 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2005); 
Maryland: Fischer v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542 (D. Md. 2000); Texas: 
Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 921, 944 (S.D. Tex. 2004); 
Michigan: Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001); New Jersey: 
Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 204 Fischer v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542 (D. Md. 2000) (quoting 
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 840, 853 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (applying 
New York law). 
 205 See, e.g., Associated Artist Entm’t, Inc. v. Walt Disney Pictures, No. CV-95-00713-
AAH, 1999 WL 132196 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1999). 
 206 See, e.g., Endemol, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049, at *15. 
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for an idea if used.207  There is authority on the validity of industry 
custom as a source of this assent in implied contracts,208 however, 
cases relying on industry custom to find the existence of an 
implied-in-fact contract concern transactions in industries other 
than television programming.209 
When a breach of contract claim alleges qualitatively different 
rights other than reproduction, adaptation, distribution, or display 
of a copyrighted work, then the right is not “within the general 
scope of copyright, and there is no preemption.”210  Determining 
the nature and existence of such qualitatively different or 
additional elements is both a legal and factual hurdle for plaintiffs.  
A publisher’s promise to pay royalties,211 or a breach of 
confidentiality in an employment agreement212 are examples of 
such an additional element.213  This principle is consistent with 
Desny v. Wilder214 where it is proven that the defendants promise, 
either express(ly) or implied(ly), to pay if the idea is used.215  
However, where the plaintiff’s assertion is a “contract-based 
 
 207 Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 267 (Cal. 1956). 
 208 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, § 16.05 at 16–35. 
 209 See, e.g., Toy business: Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 
380 (2d Cir. 2000) (toy business); Feature films: Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 
F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2004), Feature v. Spyglass Entm’t Group, LP, CV 02-0183-
SVW(JTLx), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17769, (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2002), Katz 
Dochrermann & Epstein, Inc. v. Home Box Office, No. 97 CIV. 7763(TPG), 1999 WL 
179603 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999); Advertising: Epstein, Inc. v. Home Box Office, No. 97 
CIV. 7763, 1999 WL 179603 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999).  But see Whitfield v. Lear, 751 
F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying California law). 
 210 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, § 1.01[B][1], at 1–13. 
 211 Asunto v. Shoup, 132 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452 (E.D. La. 2000). 
 212 Lennon v. Seaman, 63 F. Supp. 2d 428, 432, 438 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also 
Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., Inc., No. CV-00-02279 CAS JWJX, 2000 WL 979664, at*6–
7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000) (holding implied contract claim preempted by copyright but 
holding that breach of confidence claim was not). 
 213 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, at § 101[B][1][a], at 1–15 – 1–16. 
 214 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 215 Stewart v. World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc., No. 03 CV 2468 RLC, 2005 WL 
66890, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2005); Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 968 
(9th Cir. 2004); Chesler/Perlmutter Prods., Inc. v. Fireworks Entm’t, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 
2d 1050, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 459 (6th 
Cir. 2001); Katz Dochrermann & Epstein, Inc. v. Home Box Office, No. 97 CIV. 
7763(TPG), 1999 WL 179603, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999); Whitfield v. Lear, 751 
F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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tort,”216 that is, where the loss is some future benefit that would 
flow from an actual or prospective contract, such rights are 
considered as equivalent to copyright protection, and are therefore 
preempted.217 
A. The Desny Claim, Is It Still Viable? 
Despite the difficulties presented by copyright preemption 
doctrine, the Desny-type claim is still alive—barely.  Recently in 
Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 218 the Ninth Circuit219 affirmed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants on plaintiff’s copyright claim, but reversed the district 
court’s dismissal of an implied-in-fact contract claim.220  In 1996, 
Jeff Grosso, a screenwriter submitted a screenplay to Gotham 
Entertainment Group, a copy of which he had deposited with the 
WGA Registry.221  Gotham was connected to Miramax through a 
‘first look deal’ and was owned by a past executive of Miramax.222  
Some time thereafter, Miramax released the film “Rounders,” 
which Grosso claimed was substantially similar to his 
screenplay.223  Grosso’s submission was unsolicited.224  He 
brought suit in state court alleging a Desny-type contract claim.225  
Defendant removed to federal court where Judge Collins dismissed 
the contract claim but gave plaintiff leave to amend the complaint 
 
 216 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 15, at § 101[B][1][a][ii], at 1–17. 
 217 Cases dismissing implied contract claim: Metrano, 2000 WL 979664; Selby v. New 
Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Endemol Entm’t, B.V. v. 
Twentieth Television Inc., No. CV98-0608 ABC (BQRx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998); Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997); Associated Artist Entm’t, Inc. v. Walt Disney Pictures, No. CV-95-00713-
AAH, 1999 WL 132196 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1999); Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 
F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998); Markogianis v. Burger King Corp., No. 95 CIV. 4627(JFK), 
1997 WL 167113 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1997); Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 297 F. 
Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Tex. 2004). 
 218 Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 219 Chief Judge Schroeder writing for the panel. 
 220 Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967. 
 221 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., No. 01-57255, 2002 
WL 32302494 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 2002). 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 5–6. 
 224 Id. at 5. 
 225 Id. at 4. 
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to include copyright infringement.226  The court subsequently 
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the 
copyright claim.227 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment for the 
defendant on the copyright infringement claim, finding that the 
district court “carefully and correctly” found the works not 
substantially similar in genre, mood, pace, themes, settings, 
characters, plot and sequences of events.228  The court however 
reversed the dismissal of the implied contract claim concluding 
simply that “the complaint stated a Desny claim.”229  The court did 
not elaborate and pulled back even further by amending its opinion 
six months later; adding a penultimate paragraph declaring that the 
decision to reverse the dismissal was based solely on a finding that 
the Plaintiff’s first amended complaint stated a Desny claim.230  
The inference in this cryptic language might be that the court did 
not want to suggest, as the plaintiff had suggested in his brief,231 
that the 1976 Copyright Act had completely eliminated the 
implied-in-fact contract claim under California law. 
The implied-in-fact contract claim continues to be viable where 
the defendant clearly solicits the submission and encourages the 
plaintiff to continue further development following the initial 
pitch.  Most notable is the Sixth Circuit decision in Wrench LLC v. 
Taco Bell232 followed by a jury award of $30 million to two 
cartoonists who had pitched the “Psycho Chihuahua” character for 
use in Taco Bell’s television advertisements.233  The parties had 
been in discussion and negotiation concerning the concept for over 
18 months, including numerous presentations, a sample 
 
 226 Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id.  See also CBS Broad. Inc. v. ABC, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 8813 (LAP), 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20258, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2003). 
 229 Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967. 
 230 Grosso v. Miramax, 400 F.3d 658, 659 (9th Cir. 2005). 
231   Grosso v. Miramax, Reply Brief of Appellant 2002 WL 32302495 at *8 (9th Cir.) 
(December 27, 2002) 
 232 Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 233 Theresa Howard, Chihuahua Idea Men Win Taco Bell Suit, USA Today, June 4, 
2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/indsutries/food/2003-06-04-taco-
bell-lawsuit_x.htm. 
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commercial and a proposed licensing contract.234  Although the 
defendant claimed that their advertising agency had independently 
conceived of the campaign, the plaintiff’s pitch materials had been 
forwarded to the agency.235 The court also stated that novelty was 
not required in a contract-based claim under Michigan law.236 
The implication of these Ninth and Sixth circuit decisions 
seems to be that it is not proper to grant a defendant’s motion to 
dismiss when a plaintiff can plead that an understanding existed to 
pay for an idea if used, because the finding of an implied-in-fact 
contract requires a detailed fact-based inquiry.  However, a number 
of cases in the television industry, which have not been overruled, 
have allowed defendants to employ the one-two punch of 
removal/preemption to dismiss implied-in-fact contract claims.237 
B. The Particular Problem in Television Format Submission 
Cases 
In Endemol Entertainment, B.V.  v. Twentieth Television238  
District Judge Audrey Collins239 granted defendants motion to 
dismiss an implied contract claim based on copyright 
preemption.240  The Court held that “[t]he promise not to accept the 
benefit of a copyright work, with nothing more, is not sufficient to 
provide the extra element required for a [contract] cause of 
action.”241 
 
 234 Wrench, 256 F.3d at 450. 
 235 Id. at 449–51. 
 236 Id. at 460. 
 237 See Associated Artist Entm’t, Inc. v. Walt Disney Pictures, No. CV-95-00713-AAH, 
1999 WL 132196, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1999); Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
297 F. Supp. 2d 921, 944 (S.D. Tex. 2004); Fischer v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 
535, 542 (D. Md. 2000); Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., Inc., No. CV-00-02279 CAS JWJX, 
2000 WL 979664, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000); Endemol Entm’t, B.V. v. Twentieth 
Television Inc., No. CV98-0608 ABC (BQRx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 29, 1998); Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822 (C.D. Cal. 
1997) (holding the Copyright Act preempts breach of implied contract claims). 
 238 Endemol Entm’t, B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., No. CV98-0608 ABC (BQRx), 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998). 
 239 Judge in Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 240 Endemol, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049, at *17. 
 241 Id. at *16. 
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Endemol is a Dutch producer and international distributor of 
television programming.242  In January of 1994, Endemol 
presented a television program format for “Forgive Me,” a popular 
program that had been running in Europe since 1991, to Jonathan 
Goodson of Mark Goodson Productions at the NATPE 
Convention.243  Goodson expressed interest but negotiations ended 
in May 1994 with no agreement on terms.244  Endemol alleged that 
it was understood that disclosure was made in confidence and that 
it would be compensated for any use of the ideas.245  The following 
season, Goodson, now in his own company, co-produced a show 
entitled “Forgive and Forget” in association with Monet Lane and 
Twentieth Television, which Endemol claimed was based on the 
format it had presented.246  Endemol filed suit in federal court 
alleging copyright infringement and breach of implied-in-fact 
contract.247 
The court, following the reasoning in United States ex rel. 
Berge v. Trustees of the University of Alabama,248 found the 
plaintiff’s implied contract claim duplicative of the copyright 
infringement claim.249  Endemol asserted that the defendants had 
disclosed and exploited the ideas and “enter[ed] into an agreement 
to develop and produce Plaintiff’s ideas and concepts” thereby 
“interfering with Plaintiff’s ability to exploit and license its 
television program in the United States.”250 
The court described the plaintiff’s claim as falling into the 
category of contract claims that allege no additional rights, other 
than the promise not to benefit from the copyrighted work,251 and 
 
 242 Id. at *2. 
 243 Id. at *2–3.  NATPE stands for National Association of Television Programming 
Executives and represents broadcasters and other distributors of television programming.  
They hold an annual convention in January where program licensing deals are negotiated. 
 244 Id. at *3. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. at *3–4. 
 247 Id. at *1. 
 248 United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453 (4th 
Cir. 1997); see supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text. 
 249 See Endemol, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 at *17. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
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was therefore preempted.252  Although the plaintiff asserted breach 
of confidence, it did so only within the breach of contract claim, 
and the court summarily ignored it.253 
As Endemol demonstrates, if negotiations fail or the acquirer 
expresses no interest, and subsequently copies the underlying 
ideas, the implied contract theory will fail for two reasons.  First, 
the plaintiff cannot assert that the acquirer promised to pay for the 
idea if used.  If any promise can be inferred, it is that the acquirer 
promised not to use the idea without entering a contract.  This 
right, which is exclusive control over the material at issue, is 
equivalent to copyright and therefore preempted by federal 
copyright.254  Second, from the idea purveyor’s point of view, she 
has disclosed the idea with the expectation of entering into a 
contract at some future date.  If pleaded as a future expectation, 
this does not rise to the level of consideration necessary to sustain 
the assertion that an implied-in-fact contract has been created 
between the parties.255 
The argument that a contract claim is not qualitatively different 
from a copyright claim is troubling.  In a contract claim, whether 
the contract is written, oral, or implied-in-fact, the plaintiff must 
prove a promise, the terms of the contract, consideration, and so 
forth.  It is illogical to conclude that any promise does not 
constitute an “extra element” that makes such claims qualitatively 
different from copyright protection.  Unlike a contract, copyright 
grants exclusive right against the world.256  Even though the act of 
breaching the contract and infringing the copyright can arise from 
the same incident, these causes of action are qualitatively different. 
 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. (“Because the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second 
cause of action for breach of contract, it need not consider Plaintiff’s claim that the 
second cause of action includes a cause of action for breach of confidence.”). 
 254 See id. at *16–17; see also Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp 2d 816, 822 
(C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 255 See Associated Artist Entm’t, Inc. v. Walt Disney Pictures, No. CV-95-00713-AAH, 
1999 WL 132196, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1999). 
 256 See Pro CD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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III. THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF LEGAL OUTCOMES  ON THE 
INDUSTRY 
When one imagines the idea submission dispute, two scenarios 
come to mind.  In the first, an eager writer has pitched his life’s 
work only to see its essence appropriated without remuneration.257  
This is the Desny paradigm.  The concept may be a unique or 
common-place concept,258 based on historical facts,259 or consist of 
research performed for a producer.260  The writer subsequently sees 
a break-out hit without having received acknowledgement or 
compensation.  Cases between such purveyors of ideas and 
broadcasters are inherently different from the second scenario 
where deals are struck (or negotiations break down) between 
industry players. Although the former may be unfair, the latter will 
have serious economic consequences on the entire industry.  
Industry practice is influenced by legal outcomes. As a lack of 
legal enforcement becomes incorporated into the general practice, 
some broadcasters and producers have become more brazen in 
borrowing program formats from each other.261 
A successful series may prompt authors, who have pitched a 
show format at some time in the past and believe they recognize 
those ideas in the finished product, to claim that it was their format 
that was used to develop the series.262  For example, Leigh 
Burton’s claim, that she pitched a boxing reality show to Golden 
 
 257 See, e.g., Metrano v. Fox Broadcasting Co., No. CV-00-02279 CAS JWJX, 2000 WL 
979664, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000). 
 258 See, e.g., Murray v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 844 F.2d 988, 995 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(affirming lower court’s denial of plaintiff’s claim that NBC misappropriated his idea for 
a television series when the network produced “The Cosby Show”). 
 259 See, e.g., Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1222, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 
1997) (denying author of novel’s motion for preliminary injunction against producers of 
“Amistad”). 
 260 See, e.g., Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 613 (3d Cir. 2004) (taking up plaintiff’s claim 
that David Chase misappropriated his idea to create “The Sopranos”). 
 261 See Good Ideas, supra note 10; Bill Carter, At Fox, Reality Robbery Mastermind or 
Just Playing the Game? N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004 § E at 1. 
 262 See e.g., Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 921, 925 (S.D. Tex. 
2004); Idema v. DreamWorks, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Reyher v. 
Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 1976); Smith v. New Line 
Cinema, No. 03 Civ. 5274(DC), 2004 WL 2049232, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2004); 
Chase-Riboud, 987 F. Supp. at 1222; Baer, 392 F.3d at 613; Murray, 844 F.2d at 988. 
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Boy Productions while Mark Burnett was pitching a similar idea to 
Fox, is a frequent occurrence in the television industry.263  Multiple 
overlapping claims become an intractable dilemma in idea 
submission cases. 
The television and film industries survive on the collective 
effort of creative authors, both writers and producers, to pitch their 
ideas for the next breakout hit.  The author needs to pitch the idea 
to get the project off the ground, while studio and network 
executives rely upon hearing every pitch that is out there so as not 
to overlook that next hit, for their careers depend on it.  Despite the 
fact that a format may not be particularly novel in a general sense, 
the idea may still have value to the recipient. For instance, the 
value may be “not having to expend resources pursuing the idea 
through other channels or by having a profit-making idea 
implemented sooner rather than later.”264 
There is little incentive for a broadcaster to contract for 
television formats if the ideas behind those formats are available at 
no cost.  Negotiations for the rights to television formats continue 
due to business relationships,265 but when negotiations break down, 
there is no incentive for the broadcaster to refrain from developing 
an identical program with another producer.  If ideas have no 
 
 263 Seven similar claims were brought against Paramount Pictures resulting from the 
studio’s production of “Coming to America.” See, e.g., Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures 
Corp., No. C706083, 1990 WL 357611, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 1990); Beal v. 
Paramount Pictures, 806 F. Supp. 963, 964 (N.D. Ga. 1992).  Two similar claims were 
brought against the producers of the television series “Sea Hunt.” See Minniear v. Tors, 
72 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290 (Ct. App. 1968); Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 
Cal. Rptr. 130, 132 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).  Two analogous claims were also brought 
against Fox in relation to its series “The Next Great Champ.” See supra note 5 and 
accompanying text. 
 264 See, e.g., Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1098 (N.Y. 1993). 
 265 In the normal course of business, producers contract with authors, generally through 
their agents, to option copyrighted works, or to pay writers for fully developed scripts, or 
for production and delivery of finished projects from early stage concepts, or to license 
formats of existing programs for use in other markets.  Given the vast number of ideas 
pitched compared to the relatively small number of projects produced (at Miramax, for 
example, however, it is no wonder that so many allegations of plagiarism occur). See 
supra note 8 and accompanying text.  It is also understandable that upon hearing an 
intriguing pitch, a broadcaster or producer may inadvertently incorporate the ideas 
embodied in that pitch in the development of similar projects, leading to disputes over the 
origins of the program concept.  See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
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economic value individually, and using other people’s ideas has no 
legal consequences, the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ not to gain the 
benefit of a pitch without the involvement of the author is no 
longer maintainable.  Furthermore, as this industry custom erodes, 
the inference of industry custom is eroded as well.  Court decisions 
reflect this shift,266 finding it increasingly difficult to find that an 
implied-in-fact contract exists. 
A. A Statutory Solution is Unworkable 
A statutory solution to this problem is not possible because 
granting property rights to television formats would cast the net too 
broadly.  It would be impossible to separate the cases of over-
reaching267 from those where genuine misappropriation had taken 
place.  Robert Merges and others have argued persuasively that 
proposals for compulsory license schemes to deal with the burden 
of obtaining intellectual property licenses and, failing this, dealing 
with litigation, are economically inefficient.268  Compulsory 
licensing is useful under circumstances where many owners of 
strong property rights need to reduce transaction costs for users of 
those rights.269  In recommending a collective rights organization 
for digital content, Merges focuses on the private ordering of 
repeat exchanges where strong property entitlements are in the 
hands of many rights holders and both users and rights holders are 
motivated to overcome transactional bottlenecks.270 Examples of 
this type of collective licensing arrangement are the American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and 
patent pools. 
Television format submissions do not fit this model: that strong 
property rule entitlements motivate parties to bargain over the 
value of intellectual property.271  In contrast, the market for idea 
 
 266 See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 267 See supra notes 258, 259, 260 and accompanying text. 
 268 See Merges, supra note 28, at 1299–1300; see also Stanley M. Besen et al., An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L. REV. 383, 384 (1992) 
(considering why copyright collectives emerge and examining the laws that govern such 
collectives). 
 269 See Merges, supra note 28, at 1295. 
 270 See id. 
 271 See id. at 1305–06. 
RUBIN 3/17/2006  11:08 AM 
2006] TELEVISION FORMATS 701 
submissions is one where a small group of acquirers are 
encouraged by a lack of property rights to behave opportunistically 
in order to gain a competitive advantage in the short term.272  This 
lack of exogenous property entitlement is markedly different from 
the traditional framework of intellectual property systems.273  It is 
time for the industry to look at the long-standing problem of 
imitation of television formats, not as a conflict between the poor 
writer and the rapacious producer, but as a dispute among a tight-
knit group of acquirers sharing a common resource who 
undervalue, and therefore overexploit, that resource thereby 
discouraging investment in maintaining or replenishing the 
resource pool.274 
B. A Collective Rights Organization Is Worth Considering 
In discussing the effectiveness of collective rights 
organizations, Merges points to collective rights organizations that 
have succeeded where no property entitlement exists.275  His 
examples range from Medieval traders, to municipalities sharing 
water rights in the Los Angeles basin276.  He refers in particular to 
the work of Elinor Ostrom, who has conducted extensive research 
on common resource institutions organized to manage shared 
natural resources.277 
Ostrom defines three fundamental similarities of such 
institutions that have proven successful.278  First, the individual 
acquirers of a common-pool resource must share a past and expect 
to share a future.279  It is therefore important for individuals to 
maintain their reputations within the community.280  Second, the 
 
 272 Cf. id. at 1319 (arguing that collective rights organizations “bundle rights and settle 
accounts among members”). 
 273 See e.g., Besen, supra note 269, at 383; Merges, supra note 28, at 1301 n. 13. 
 274 Cf. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (analyzig self regulated institutions which manage the 
sharing of natural resources such as water rights, fisheries, and forestry). 
 275 See Merges, supra note 28, at 1323–24. 
 276 See id. 
 277 See id. at 1322; See generally OSTROM, supra note 269. 
 278 See OSTROM, supra note 269, at 88–89. 
 279 Id. at 88. 
 280 Id. 
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individuals in the group must share accepted norms of proper 
behavior and have similar goals.281  Third, the group must have 
“institutional robustness.”282  That is, rules of behavior have been 
devised and modified over time, according to a set of governing 
principles.283 
The condition in the television industry fits this pattern.  
Television is a close-knit industry.  There are only a handful of 
media companies that control the pipeline for broadcast output.284  
Furthermore, these companies are owned by media conglomerates 
that have significant station and cable network ownership.285 
The suppliers of television format ideas, although a much more 
numerous group, are generally members of the WGA, the union for 
both feature film and television writers, and the agents who 
represent them.286  Membership requirements for the WGA tend to 
screen out non-repeat players.287  There is also a great deal of 
cross-over by individuals alternating between the network side and 
the production side.  This creates an environment where norms of 
behavior, although informal, are inviolate.  As to the rules of 
behavior, each network has its own corporate culture; however, at 
the programming level the rotation of individuals tends to promote 
uniform behavior and therefore “institutional robustness.”  
 
 281 Id. at 88–89. 
 282 Id. at 89. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Five companies—Viacom, Disney, General Electric, News Corp. and Time Warner–
control over 75% of television viewing.  WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., THE 
BIG PICTURE, STATE OF THE INDUSTRY, http://www.wga.org/organizesub.aspx?id=1036 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2006).  Viacom owns CBS and the UPN, General Electric owns 
NBC, Disney owns ABC, News Corp. owns Fox, and Time Warner owns the WB. 
 285 E.g., Viacom also owns the MTV Networks group, Spike TV, BET and seventeen 
local CBS affiliates in major markets; Time Warner owns CNN, HBO, TNT, TBS, and 
Time Warner Cable; NBC Universal owns the USA Network, Telemundo, Bravo, CNBC, 
and MSNBC, as well as fourteen local NBC affiliates in major markets; News Corp. also 
owns FX; and Disney also owns the Disney Channel, ESPN, half of Lifetime, ABC 
Family, and nine local ABC affiliates in major markets. 
 286 See WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE 
WGA, WEST, INC., http://www.wga.org/subpage_whoweare.aspx?id=84 (last visited Jan. 
17, 2006). 
 287 Merges, supra note 28, at 1367–68. 
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Informal enforcement techniques of ostracism and even boycott 
occur regularly without any formal mechanism.288 
For the above reasons, the television industry satisfies 
Ostrom’s fundamental attributes for the development of a 
common-pool resource institution.  The desire to overcome 
opportunism and reduce transaction costs, including the cost of 
litigation, makes this viable.  In Europe, where licensing of 
television formats is a much more robust business than in the U.S., 
a voluntary organization has developed to address the issue of 
format copying.289 
1. FRAPA 
Format licensing in Europe faces similar legal obstacles as 
those discussed here.  To address these issues the Format 
Recognition and Protection Association was formed in Germany in 
2000.290  It was started by television production companies with 
the objective of defining a code of conduct and mediating disputes 
that arise over television formats in international markets.291  
FRAPA currently consists of more than 100 companies from 
within the television and broadcasting industries.292  In 2003, it 
mediated 18 format plagiarism disputes.293  The organization is 
supported with government funds from the state of North Rhine-
Westphalia in Germany.294 
Due to the cultural diversity and language differences across 
markets in Europe, the licensing of formats as an alternative to the 
licensing of finished programs is in high demand. A successful 
show in one country is less likely to play well in another.  
Therefore, although the opportunity to recreate the format of a 
successful show using local talent may be more expensive than 
 
 288 Id. at 1368 (referring to informal sanctions of the form “you’ll never eat lunch in this 
town again.”). 
 289 http://www.frapa.org/homepage.html (FRAPA was formed in 2000 to address this 
issue) (last visited Jan. 17, 2006). 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. 
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direct program licensing, local programming is generally more 
popular with viewers and also increases local production 
revenues.295  This drives the format licensing industry.  The 
organization’s membership consists of television format 
licensors.296  Its secondary long-term goal, to lobby for more 
clearly defined legal protection for formats, may limit its ability to 
affect the business practice of acquirers of programming.297 
In Ostrom’s analyses of common-pool resource institutions, it 
is the acquirer group that must develop and agree to a set of rules 
controlling the exploitation of the resource.298  This is a paradigm 
shift from the purpose and governance of collective rights 
organizations such as ASCAP.299  Here, there is no strong property 
right held by the suppliers of television format ideas.  On the 
contrary, it is the fact that this resource is free for the taking that 
threatens its sustainability.300 
Confirming this analysis, collective rights organizations such 
as the Authors Registry and the Publication Rights Clearinghouse, 
which represent freelance writers in their efforts to collect royalty 
payments for re-use of their published works, have had only 
limited success.301  This is because the publishers are not members.  
From a publisher’s perspective, it is more cost-effective (especially 
when the cost is zero) to obtain all rights initially rather than 
limited rights that may be augmented by contracting with a CRO 
later.302  The analogy to television formats is striking.  The author 
 
 295 See generally Good Ideas, supra note 10. 
 296 Id. 
 297 Cf. Bettina C. Goldmann, New Law on Copyright Contracts in Germany, 9 
COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 17, 17 (2002). 
 298 OSTROM, supra note 269, at 58. 
 299 Merges, supra note 28, at 1361 (suggesting that “[t]ransactions, not entitlements, are 
the starting point from which economic activity follows” for exchange institutions in the 
absence of property rights). 
 300 Cf. Ostrom at 5–7 (citing Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965)) 
(“unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some 
other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.”  (Olson  
p. 2; emphais in original). Id. at 6. 
 301 Maureen A. O’Rourke, Bargaining in the Shadow of Copyright Law After Tasini, 53 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 605, 632–33 (2003). 
 302 Id. at 633. 
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suggests that unlike the example of FRAPA, the Authors Registry, 
or PRC, a collective rights organization for television format rights 
must be formed and supported by the acquirers of formats, and 
must be justified by the economic benefit of cooperative 
exploitation of a common resource,  and the reduction in litigation 
costs. 
2. The Writers’ Guild of America and the WGA Registry 
Under the organization of the WGA, a system for the 
identification, administration and arbitration of television format 
rights can be successfully implemented.  Unlike FRAPA,303 this 
should include representation of format acquirers: broadcasters, 
distributors and production companies, as well as format 
purveyors. 
 Those who write for TV or movies are represented by the 
WGA.304  The union has been relatively successful in attaining 
reasonable levels of compensation for its members.305  It has 
essentially granted copyright ownership to producers in return for 
decent rates of pay, residuals, and the ability to control the credit 
screenwriters receive.306  Major broadcasters and production 
companies, those who hire members under Guild contracts, are 
signatory members of the Guild.307  It should be noted that many 
 
 303 See supra, notes 284–289 and accompanying text. 
 304 WGA Home Page, http://www.wga.org/. 
 305 See Lionel S. Sobel, A Practical Guide to Copyright Ownership and Transfer: The 
Differences Between Licenses, Assignments and Works Made for Hire and Suggestions 
for Analyzing which One is “Best” For a Particular Transaction, ENT. L. REP., Feb. 
1984 3, 7 (1984) (“Virtually all successful screenwriters belong to the Writers Guild of 
America which has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with virtually all 
producers.”). 
 306 John M. Kernochan, Ownership and Control of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Motion Pictures and Audiovisual Works: Contractual and Practical Aspects – Response f 
the United States to the ALAI Questionnaire, ALAI Congress, Paris, September 20, 1995, 
20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 379, 402 (1996) (“[T]he Guild has . . . established 
minimum scales of payment . . . negotiated basic “residual” payments . . . reserved rights 
of “novelization” . . . [and] control[led] the determination . . . of writing credits for 
screenplays . . . .”). 
 307 WGA, supra note 299. 
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cable networks and smaller production companies do not use 
WGA writers and are not signatories.308 
The WGA developed a “Script Registry” to lower both the risk 
of misappropriation or over-reaching in script and format 
submission situations.309  For a fee, writers can deposit a copy of a 
script they are going to submit with the Registry, which date-
stamps it and stores it for five years.310  This system offers some 
evidence of authorship to script writers when they submit 
treatments or scripts.  The Registry encourages the writer to 
include a notice of his registration on the materials he submits.311  
This gives the writers a sense of security but no legal protection 
against misappropriation.312  The WGA will testify, if necessary, as 
to the date of submission; however they do not review or even 
have a way of knowing the content of any material deposited in the 
Registry.313  The WGA receives 30,000 submissions annually 
maintaining the file for 5 years and have approximately 150,000 
submissions on file at any time.314  The WGA also operates an 
arbitration service that resolves about 300 cases each year.315  By 
developing a governance structure consisting of both signatory and 
member participants, the WGA Registry could be augmented to 
offer a more active role in setting rules that could manage 
television format submissions between and among industry 
participants—those who pitch formats as well as those who receive 
them. 
Robert Merges has adapted Elinor Ostrom’s design principles 
common to successful common resource institutions to the 
intellectual property area.316  As Merges suggests, there is a great 
 
 308 Id. 
 309 Merges, supra, note 28 at 1366–67. 
 310 WGA-Registration Details, http://www.wga.org/subpage_register.aspx?id= 
1192#duration. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. 
 315 WGA-Legal and Claims, http://www.wga.org/subpage_whoweare.aspx?id=813. 
 316 Merges, supra, note 28, at 1360–61. 
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deal of overlap between the problems of allocating a shared natural 
resource and repeated transactions in abstract property rights.317 
Merges Design Principles for Intellectual Property Rights 
Exchange Institutions 
1. Start small 
2. Include members with low mutual monitoring costs 
3. Assign knowledgeable industry members to the key 
task of valuing information 
4. Include grievance/dispute resolution staffed by 
experts 
5. Structure governance to reflect interests of each 
distinct class of members 
6. Carefully manage relations with government 
authorities318 
Under these guiding principles, a detailed analysis of current 
business practices in television format submission transactions 
could help to determine a set of rules that can offer some modicum 
of predictability for originators of television formats, producing 
entities, and broadcasters.  The standards that such a study would 
develop include but are not limited to: 
o What constitutes a television format (as 
distinguished from a mere idea). 
o Standards on similarity, originality, concreteness 
and novelty for formats. 
o Standards of confidentiality. 
o Standards on anti-competitive practice among 
broadcasters and distributors. 
o Viability of royalty and attribution awards. 
o Mechanisms for registration, reporting, monitoring 
and enforcement. 
 
 317 Id. at 1360. 
 318 Id. at 1361. 
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o Industry-wide best practices for the submission and 
receipt of proposals with considerations for both 
solicited and unsolicited submissions. 
o The goal: a more robust, more creative television 
industry. 
CONCLUSION 
The result of case law on idea submissions points to the 
conclusion that unless an acquirer of a television format is willing 
to pay for something which he might otherwise have for free, the 
courts will not grant recovery for the unauthorized use of an idea 
or for the service provided in pitching the idea.  At the same time, 
even where a producer or broadcaster has attempted to protect 
itself in its relationship with idea purveyors, the likelihood is high 
that at least one and probably several people will file suit for each 
successful show that the producer generates. 
This problem has been viewed as a conflict between the 
interests of the creative writer/producer and the interests of the 
acquiring distributor/broadcaster.  This is true only at the case 
level.  At the industry-wide level the conflict is among a rather 
confined group of players, who may at any time find themselves on 
either side of the dispute. 
Furthermore, the commercial value of any product is, in part, 
determined by its legal status.  This is important in the television 
industry, for example, in financing production companies who 
must be able to rely on the proper valuation of their intellectual 
property assets.  The eventual result of the uncertainty of legal 
outcomes in television format submission cases must be market 
failure, the commodification of television programming, and the 
erosion of audience share to other entertainment media where 
innovation is encouraged. 
Viewed in this way, a voluntary collective rights organization 
could reduce transaction, monitoring and enforcement costs for 
idea submission in the television industry and encourage the 
development of new ideas that are the fuel for innovative 
programming. 
